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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Lee Hargrave*
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The primary harm of racial discrimination is the stigmatic injury
that results from considering all members of a class as inferior,
disregarding individual merit.1 A common occurrence of this harm is
the exclusion of racial minorities from participation as full citizens in
government and civil affairs. Though modern cases focus on denial
of the right to vote, as early as 1879, Strauder v. West Virginia2 prohibited the statutory exclusion of blacks from juries. The notion
then, as now, is that a purposeful exclusion of blacks from jury service is the result of considering them as inferior-as not educated
enough, as not fair enough, as lacking enough commitment to the
civic community to make proper decisions of guilt or innocence in
criminal proceedings.
Given these concerns, it would be simple to conclude that state
action intentionally excluding blacks from grand and petit juries is
prohibited by the state and federal constitutions. In this context it
is the excluded jurors who are primarily hurt. If one is concerned
with the use of peremptory challenges by the state to exclude
blacks from petit jury service, the most direct victims of that
discrimination are the potential jurors who are challenged. It is they
whom the state thinks unworthy to serve. Injunctive relief and
damages would appear to be appropriate remedies on their behalf.
The practical problem, of course, is that of proving discriminatory
motivation and of proving damages. Experience also indicates that
few suits of this kind will be brought. Instead, it is the minority
defendant who usually will raise the issue.
A pure equal protection analysis becomes more difficult when
one considers the harm done to a defendant who is tried (and
perhaps convicted) by a jury from which blacks are excluded. The
stigmatic harm reflecting unworthiness to participate in the civic
process is in a general way shared by all blacks, including this
defendant, but the stigmatic harm is not as direct as that caused the
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
2. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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excluded juror. Even if the defendant somehow shares in the
stigmatic harm, it is difficult logically to require a reversal of his
conviction as a means of remedying that harm. Indeed, he suffers
that harm whether he is convicted or acquitted. The Strauder rationale provided the constitutional basis for a statute to remove
criminal cases to federal court in such an instance of exclusion.
Modern cases have gone further and provide that reversal of the
conviction is the proper remedy; State v. Washington' so provides.
Though notions and policies of equality are certainly important in
analyzing these cases, a straight equal protection analysis does not
support the remedy that is granted.
Another approach to the problem is to emphasize sixth amendment jury trial values and the traditional view that a jury ought to
be a reasonable representation of the community of which the defendant is a part. The historical importance of juries in reflecting community values is implemented only if the jury displays a rough approximation of the policies and viewpoints of the community. This
notion certainly seems to be at the heart of the grand jury cases
and the cases which deal with selection of venires." A consistent application of this policy would enable any person to claim unfair treatment if the jury excluded certain groups, whether the defendant was
a member of that group or not.' It would also follow that relief
should be granted whether the exclusion of minority groups was intentional or not; but that has not been the development of the
cases.' One has to conclude that the representation-of-the-community
rationale does not explain these cases; yet, running through them
are some influences of this rationale.
3. 375 So. 2d 1162 (1979) (reversal was summary upon a showing of prosecutorial
discrimination).
4. The preeminent case in this area is Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). Using
an equal protection analysis, the Court in Smith reversed the conviction of a young
black defendant upon a showing that blacks had been systematically excluded from his
grand jury. Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Black stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public
justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial
discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified
groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at
war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.

Id. at 130.
5. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), allowed a man relief when women
were excluded from his jury. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), allowed a white to
assert a claim based on exclusion of blacks.
6.

Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (all-male grand jury found not

illegally constituted because no opportunity to select women).
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Indeed, a rigorous application of that rationale would require
total elimination of the peremptory challenge system. To the extent
that the jury selection system depends upon random selection to
provide a representative sample, the peremptory challenge system
works to defeat the random selection process. Yet, the cases seem in
no way inclined to do away with peremptory challenge. Another
anomaly thus enters the analysis, requiring us to (1) allow for nonrational elimination of prospective jurors by both sides in criminal
cases, (2) while at the same time somehow providing some
reasonable mirror of the community and (3) also prohibiting
stigmatic exclusion of minority groups by the state.
The accomodation of these conflicting concerns and the explanation of the seemingly conflicting case developments lead to a more
flexible due process analysis reflecting both equal protection and
cross section values, but incorporating neither analysis in totality.
Under this approach, it would seem that the key harm is the risk
that a jury from which blacks have been intentionally excluded will
render an unfair verdict because there would be lacking in the jury
persons who reflect and understand the defendant's upbringing,
emotions, motivations, intentions, and environment. Such a jury
would be less likely to empathize with the defendant, less likely to
give him the reasonable doubt than would one more understanding
of his total personality-or at least there is the risk that such a jury
would do so. In other words, one wants to give the minority defendant at least an equal chance at a representative jury, and intentional exclusion by the state of minority group members creates a
risk of skewing that equal opportunity.
It would seem that this harm could be said to exist whenever
blacks are missing from the jury, whether because of intentional
discrimination or as the result of accident. Indeed, the early cases
seem to have gone in this direction; but Washington v. Davis7 has
apparently reinterpreted these cases to require racial motivation,
with the de facto disparity being used to support inferences of intentional exclusion of blacks. Perhaps the explanation can be that de
facto exclusion does not give rise to the inference that the community is so structured as to result in juries that would not empathize with blacks. On the other hand, purposeful exclusion of
blacks is more likely to involve the kind of community, the kind of
case, and the kind of prosecutorial approach which exclude those
persons who would be more empathetic and more reflective of the
black milieu.
7.

426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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Under this approach, it also appears that the often-stated requirement that the exclusion of blacks be a long-standing occurrence
within a court or on the part of one prosecutor is not truly an element of the substantive right involved.' If the risk of unfairness is
the heart of the injury, the right ought to exist whenever the risk
exists-and on that issue, the fact that other trials have been
similarly tainted would be irrelevant. Perhaps the long-standing
nature of the exclusion might be used to support inferences that the
exclusion is purposeful and not accidental. A history of systematic
exclusions would thus have a role to play as a matter of evidence and
presumption, but it would not logically be part of the substantive
right.
Under this view, proof of purposeful motivation may be difficult,
but when the proof is there, the right should be available. And,
when the systematic exclusion is shown, that should be adequate
basis to put the burden on the prosecution to establish that the exclusion was not racially motivated.
One might argue that an unstated reason for the reversal of convictions is to provide a means of deterring (punishing?) prosecutors
for having excluded blacks. The concern would not be with the fairness of the jury or the result, .but would be to try to fashion a
remedy to prevent future discrimination by a prosecutor. It is hardly a well-tailored remedy that closely fits the evil; and it would also
hardly explain the requirement in the cases that the exclusion be
systematic over a long period of time.
The argument has been advanced that some importance, even
decisive importance, ought to be placed on the fact that most prosecutors rationally believe, based on their experience, that blacks on
juries are less likely to convict than whites.? That may well be true
8. This requirement was set forth by the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Swain approach was followed in the most recent term of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. See State v. Manning, 380 So. 2d 54 (La. 1980); State v.
Allen, 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980); State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240 (La. 1979). Even State
v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979), which reversed the conviction of a black
defendant by a jury from which all blacks had been excluded, but did so only after the
Swain test purportedly was met.
But see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-79
Term-- Criminal Law & Procedure, 40 LA. L. REV. 635, 650 (1980) (suggesting that the
Louisiana results are not required by Swain; "[tlhe court has apparently twisted the
Swain test into something akin to the Eames concurrence").
In United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974), Judge Alvin
Rubin felt obligated to follow Swain since defendants failed to prove systematic exclusion of blacks by use of peremptory challenges; however, he exercised his powers
under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to order a new trial.
9. Such was the belief of the prosecutor in Washington. Explaining his disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against blacks, he stated:
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in some types of cases in some communities. Even so, it is of no im-

portance. The question is not whether race-dependent decisions are
rational or not; the question is whether they are unfair. Indeed,
many racial classifications are rational. Since blacks tend to be
poorer than whites, for example, racial classifications are a rational
proxy for choosing between the rich and the poor. This is just as rational as hiring only persons with normal weight as airline pilots
because overweight people are more prone to heart attacks. The essence of the equal protection concern here, though, is that the racial
classification is unfair; it is hurtful; it stigmatizes the individual
because of his group membership. Because of this, it is disallowed,
even if it is rational.
In any event, if any conclusions can be drawn in this uncertain
area, it would seem that both the federal and state approach is off
the mark in indicating that long-standing, systematic discrimination
in exclusion is needed to trigger the remedy. That notion is but a
matter of procedure and proof to support the inference of purposeful
discrimination; but if intent and purpose can be shown by other evidence, that should be sufficient for relief. One can also probably
safely conclude that while there is some basis to require purposeful
discrimination to qualify for relief, the basis is weak enough to support the approach that de facto exclusion warrants inferences of
purposeful exclusion and to support putting the burden on the state
to show that the exclusion was not based on race.
SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION

The Louisiana Supreme Court has been reluctant to follow the
trends established by the United States Supreme Court in sexual
discrimination cases; while it refused to invalidate the state's
alimony legislation in 1978,0 in Lovell v. Lovell," it followed Orr v.
2 and felt "compelled to declare La. Civ. Code art. 160 unOrr"
constitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the
state and federal constitutions .... .""1 The impact of Lovell is
I have found through experience, some twenty-three years in the District Attorney's office, that blacks, where you have a black defendant, will generally vote
not guilty, in spite of the strength of the state's case ..

.

. I find, not without

justification, particularly young blacks, they are very resentful of the white
establishment.
375 So. 2d at 1163.
10. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
11. 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
12. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
13. 378 So. 2d at 420-21. In so ruling, the court overruled Loyacano v. Loyacano,
358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978), which upheld the constitutionality of article 160 even though
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minimal, since the federal cases already provide an overriding solution to the problem, and since article 160 was amended effective
June 29, 1979, to be gender-neutral." The case, however, does pose a
continuing problem of remedy.
In Lovell a former husband sought to be relieved from paying
alimony because article 160 was allegedly unconstitutional. The majority, without discussion, apparently assumed this requested remedy to be the correct one, and then concluded that Lovellwill be
applied prospectively only. Thus, the husband was granted no relief.
Even if one accepts the principle of prospective-only application of a
decision construing the state constitution, it seems improper not to
grant the relief in the first case in which the principle is established.
This is certainly a different prospective-only theory from that which
has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court."6
More to the point, however, is the fact that what is involved is
not the prospective or retroactive application of a state court construction of a state constitution, but rather the prospective or
retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Orr v. Orr. Though Lovell seems to indicate that it is applying
both federal and state constitutional provisions, it clearly states it is
"compelled" to follow Orr. The crucial date of Orr is March 5, 1979.
Even if the decision is applied prospectively only, it will be applied
in all cases arising after March 5, 1979. The result is that alimony
judgments rendered between March 5 and June 29, 1979, the effective date of the amendment to article 160, are in jeopardy. This
result is not only messy, but unnecessary.
A proper solution would be to avoid the question of retroactive
or prospective application and simply say the proper remedy, as in
it provided alimony for needy wives who had not been at fault, but not for similarly
situated husbands. In Loyacano v. Leblanc, 440 U.S. 952 (1979), the decision was
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Orr. The issue of article 160's
constitutionality was pretermitted, however, when Dr. Loyacano abandoned his attack
in light of the supreme court decision.
14. 1979 La. Acts, No. 72.
15. A prospective-only rule would nonetheless benefit the litigants in the case
that does establish the new rule. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967), the
Supreme Court wrote:
We recognize that Wade and Gilbert are, therefore, the only victims of pretrial
confrontations in the absence of their counsel to have the benefit of the rules
established in their cases. That they must be given that benefit is, however, an
unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not
stand as mere dictum. Sound policies . .. that we resolve issues solely in concrete
cases or controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to
advance contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying Wade
and Gilbert the benefit of today's decisions.
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most equal protection cases, is to extend the benefit in question to
the excluded class."6 All that equal protection demands is equality;
this could mean alimony to needy spouses of either sex, or alimony
to no one. The court need not have assumed that the second alternative was the proper one, but should have discussed the state's
basic policy as to whether alimony ought to be continued or not.
Most states, in a similar inquiry, have decided that the proper relief
is to grant alimony to both spouses, and thus not to absolve husbands from paying alimony to wives.'"
Once it is decided that the state has no adequate basis for denying alimony after divorce to needy ex-husbands, it follows that state
criminal statutes making nonsupport of wives by husbands an offense, but not nonsupport of husbands by wives, are equally without
rational basis. While one might argue a legitimate state interest in
alleviating the effects of past discrimination against women, the
means of fulfilling that interest by a blanket classification denying
the benefit to needy men is not necessary. State v. Fuller" adopts
this analysis and holds that article 74 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code, defining criminal neglect of family,' 9 is unconstitutional. Fuller
overrules State v. Barton," which held otherwise, and which was
criticized for doing so." Article 74 has since been amended to be
gender-neutral."
The same court that decided Barton also decided State v.
Devall" in 1974 and held that it was not a denial of equal protection
for a prostitution statute to penalize only females who offer sexual
services for sale. That case was also criticized," and a subsequent
16. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
17. In re marriage of Mitchell, 579 P.2d 613 (1978); Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72
(Maine 1978); Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa.
278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973). Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (state failed to
reconcile discriminatory law declared unconstitutional by Supreme Court).
18. 377 So. 2d 335 (La. 1979).
19. LA. R.S. 14:74(A)(1) (1950 & Supp. 1979). Prior to its amendment, this statute
proscribed the desertion or intentional nonsupport "[b]y a husband of his wife who is in
destitute or necessitous circumstances when he has the financial means to provide support." LA. R.S. 14:74(A)(1) (1950 & Supp. 1978) (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts,
No. 614).
20. 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975).
21. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Terin-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 535 (1976).
22. 1979 La. Acts, No. 614.
23. 302 So. 2d 909 (La. 1974). Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Barham dissented;
Justice Calogero dissented from the denial of a rehearing.
24. 1974-75 Term, supra note 21, at 535.
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legislative amendment 5 of the prostitution statute which made it
gender-neutral presumably reflects state policy that no adequate
basis existed to support such distinctions. In any event, it seems
questionable to use Devall as authority to support the decision in
State v. Hollins,26 in which the court found no denial of equal protection in a statute making it a crime to entice female minors, but not
male minors, into prostitution. Since the legislature also has amended
article 86 of the Criminal Code to make the enticing of minors into
prostitution a gender-neutral crime, 7 the impact of Hollins will be
minimal. Still, the case is questionable and should be considered a
maverick without precedential authority. The court's alternative rationale in Hollins suggests that enticing minor males into prostitution simply does not present a social problem, whereas enticement
of minor females does present such a problem. This may be so, but
it does not address the basic question of the legislative basis for excluding minor males from this protection.
However, the main rationale of the case presents even more difficulty. In Hollins, the equal protection defense was raised to contest
a conviction of a male who argued the statute's unconstitutionality.
Justice Summers' opinion for the court suggests that the defendant
had no standing to challenge the classification:
In the case at bar defendants are over twenty-one years of age
and therefore bear no relationship to unprotected minor males
other than as potential panderers. Failure to allow the defendants to assert the equal protection rights of this class would result in no harm, as the legislature has heretofore amended the
statute in question. Therefore defendants lack the requisite
standing to assert the invalidity of the classification. 8
This analysis would never allow any person to contest the invalidity
of such a statute. The suggestion that a minor male who had been
enticed might be the proper person to contest the statute fails, for
in criminal statutes, the court is under due process constraints and
cannot expand the statute to cover minor males. Indeed, if this rationale were to be taken seriously, it should have been invoked in
Lovell v. Lovell, and that case disposed of solely on that ground.
Perhaps the point of the Hollins analysis that would come closer to
jus tertii principles relates to the fact that the legislature has
changed the statute, and thus no harm will be caused other persons
by the failure of the court to address the problem. But this is not at
25.
26.
27.
28.

1977 La. Acts, No. 49.
375 So. 2d 922 (La. 1979).
1978 La. Acts, No. 434, amending LA. R.S. 14:86 (1950).
375 So. 2d at 923.
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all a standing issue, and the defendant in the case is certainly harmed
by virtue of his conviction.
Hollins does not discuss what possible rational bases there
might be to make it a crime to entice female, but not male, minors
into prostitution. Presumably, the possible psychological harm that
could result would be the same for males and females. The possible
estrangement from parents, introduction into a drug culture, and dependence on pimps would also seem to be the same whether the
minor is male or female, and whether the minor is to engage in
heterosexual or homosexual activities. Perhaps an argument can be
fashioned relating to the possibility of pregnancy or damage to the
reproductive system of young females. However, when one is engaged in prostitution, appropriate measures normally are taken to
prevent pregnancy, and the asserted jusitification probably will not
meet the high level of scrutiny that is required in sexual discrimination cases.
29
A more closely fought issue appears in cases like State v. Bell,
dealing with statutory rape or carnal knowledge statutes which
make it an offense for a male to have heterosexual intercourse with
a minor female, but not for a female to have heterosexual intercourse with a minor male. In Bell, the court sustained the statute,
saying: "We share the view that protection of young females from
pregnancy, from possible injury to their reproductive systems as
well as the possibility of lingering mental impairment, is a
legitimate area of state concern justifying the sex classification involved in subject statutes."3 Bell is in accord with most jurisdictions
in the United States which have faced this question or similar
statutory rape questions. 1 At least, those cases would take the same
view with respect to a statute that simply made consensual intercourse with a young female an offense when committed by a male.
29. 377 So. 2d 303 (La. 1979).
30. Id. at 306.
31. See, e.g. Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir. 1977); Hall v. McKenzie, 537
F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1978); State v. Kelly, 111
Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974); People v. McKellar, 146 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1978); People v.
Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976); State v. Brothers, 384 A.2d 402 (Del. 1978);
State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815 (Maine 1978); Brooks v. State, 24 Md. 334, 330 A.2d 670
(1975); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. 211, 245 N.W.2d 612 (1976); State v. Craig, 169 Mont.
150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976); State v. Thompson, 162 N.J. 302, 392 A.2d 679 (1978); People
v. Weidiger, 410 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1978); Olson v. State, 588 P.2d 1018 (1979); State v.
Giles, 34 N.C. 112, 237 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Stewart v. State, 534 S.W.2d 875 (1975);
Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. 1975); Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 230
N.W.2d 637 (1975).
But the trend appears to be the contrary; see Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The possibility of pregnancy argument has some appeal and
would certainly seem to be a strong argument in the case of unconsented-to intercourse. However, Bell involved what is by definition
consensual intercourse, in which presumably the dangers of unwanted pregnancy can be handled by the parties. The statute's justification then has to go to a less solid level, being based on the notion that the minor girl does not appreciate the possibility of pregnancy and may not take the appropriate precautions. Maybe such an
argument would support a statute subject only to a low level of
scrutiny, but it is hard to find this a basis to withstand a higher
level of scrutiny.
The argument emphasizing the danger to the reproductive
system of young females also has much stronger force when one is
dealing with unconsented-to intercourse. It would be hard to sustain
the possibility of serious damage to the female's reproductive
system when the intercourse is consensual. The concern with
psychological damage would seem to be a concern which would apply equally to young males as well as to young females. The argument that there are few male victims fails to face the essential question of whether there is a rational basis for not protecting those
males who would be victims.
The Bell statute raises more complications, however, for it involved not the simple heterosexual intercourse type of statute. As a
result of a series of amendments," articles 80 and 81 of the Criminal
Code produces a scheme in which a ten-year prison sentence can result if any person, male or female, has anal or oral intercourse with
any underage person, male or female; if the intercourse is vaginal
the older male is again subject to the ten-year penalty, but the older
female having vaginal intercourse with a minor male is subject only
to a five-year penalty. The complications of protecting young males
from anal or oral intercourse by older men or women, but not protecting them as much from heterosexual intercourse seems to have
virtually no rational basis. The only apparent justification is a
greater prohibition of "unnatural" sex on the part of young males.
Indeed, it is almost impossible to find any rational basis for the present anomalous approach of article 80, which, practically speaking, is
but the result of hit and miss amendment over several years, without an overall, overriding, rational policy to support the legislation.

32. R.S. 14:80 was amended by Act 539 of 1977 and Act 757 of 1978. R.S. 14:81
was amended by Act 537 of 1977.
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OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS

As the federal equal protection guarantee has developed, racial
classifications receive the highest scrutiny;33 it is virtually impossible to conceive of any basis that would support racial classifications
that are harmful to a disadvantaged minority. Article I, section 3 of
the Louisiana Constitution imposes a similarly high standard of
justification on discrimination based on race, as well as on that based
on religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. 4 Sexual discrimination is
subject to a less demanding, but still quite high, level of scrutiny
under both constitutions. In Article I, section 3, the prohibition is
against "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" discrimination
because of "birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliations." 5
Numerous legislative classifications, other than on the bases
mentioned, result in differing treatment of persons, and these will
be subject to more or less scrutiny, depending on the extent of harm
caused by the classification. The analysis here has been to start with
racial discrimination, the prototype and most historically significant
form of discrimination, and to try to extrapolate from the harms
there discerned a. more general theory that supports a stricter
scrutiny for some classifications. Special judicial solicitude for the
disadvantaged minority is justified by a long-established, historical
pattern of discrimination, similar to racial discrimination, and by exclusion of the disadvantaged group from the political process.
Unalterable traits, as race, which are beyond the power of an individual to change, are more suspect bases of classification than are
traits within the power of individuals to change. Pervasive discrimination sanctioned and encouraged by law leads to cumulative harms
that are more serious than discriminations that may randomly
balance each other off. Sexual discrimination, for example, meets
some of these tests-unalterable traits, history of discrimination-but not, perhaps, the cumulative harms test of racial
discrimination. Also, the class of women has never been a "discrete
and insular minority"3 like blacks have been. On the other hand,
legislative classifications based on financial condition, age, intelligence, state of residence, etc., have been thought of as failing to

33.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214

(1944).

34.

Hargrave, The Declarationof Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35

LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974).
35. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
36. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
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meet these requirements which merit greater scrutiny." A number
of Louisiana cases this year reflect this approach, finding no impermissible classifications in a number of instances.
In State v. Nettles,38 the supreme court approved a legislative
classification which provides for expungement of records of arrests
for ordinances and misdemeanors, but not for felonies. The felonymisdemeanor distinction, a classification that distinguishes between
serious and less serious offenses, does not result from some intrinsic
characteristic or unalterable trait and does not reach an insular and
discrete minority; so a high level of scrutiny does not seem appropriate. Adequate rational basis for distinguishing between felony
arrests and arrests for misdemeanors was seen by the court in that,
for the most serious offenses, arrest records are useful in uncovering criminal conduct, in setting bond, and in facilitating the work of
correctional institutions. Though Nettles could be criticized on the
basis of statutory construction, as dissenting Justice Tate did, the
equal protection question does not present serious problems. It is
conceivable that classifying as a felony conduct which, according to
fundamental values, is not serious might result in a classification
scheme without rational basis. But absent that circumstance, the
constitutional issue of arrest records expungement would seem to be
more a matter of due process than one of equal protection. The inquiry would be whether one has some fundamental right to privacy
that would prohibit dissemination of information about one's arrest
when one is in fact innocent of any wrongdoing.
39
In Kirsch v. Parker,
the supreme court held that a statute making access to adoption records by adopted children more difficult
than under prior law could be applied to adoptions completed before
the passage of the act. An equal protection argument was not necessary for decision, and the case presents essentially a due processright to privacy problem. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in holding that the statute could not be applied to adoptions
completed before the passage of the act, raised an intriguing
reverse equal protection argument. Applying the statute to all
adopted persons would seem to involve no classification at all, for
everyone is being treated the same. However, Judge Redmann suggested that it was a denial of equal protection to fail to make a

37. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (minimum rationality applied to state statute requiring retirement at age fifty for uniformed police
officers); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (students who applied from out-of-state
deprived of reduced university tuition); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (refusing to make wealth alone a trigger for strict scrutiny).
38. 375 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1979).
39. 383 So. 2d 384 (La. 1980).
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distinction between adoptions completed under the old law, where
there was no expectation of complete privacy, and adoptions taking
place under the new law. He concluded, "the legitimate legislative
purposes of promoting adoption and dissuading abortion today did
not justify discriminating against a class that includes children who
were adopted many years ago and who were several years old when
adopted.""0 This is certainly a novel approach, for the equal protection analysis normally is concerned more with the propriety of
classifications than with the failure to make classifications. It would
be more straightforward to analyze this problem in terms of the expectations of privacy and confidentiality.4 ' Under this theory, these
rights may in fact be taken without due process by a statute that
would change the requirement for access to adoption records.
2
was concerned with the power
Acorn v. City of New Orleans"
of a local governmental subdivision to impose a $100 annual charge
on each parcel of immovable property. An equal protection attack
suggested it was improper to levy this charge on each "parcel" of
property listed in the tax assessments of the city "without regard to
the value, use, size or location, whether tax exempt or not, and
regardless of the assessed valuation of the property." 3 Certainly it
was an unusual fund raising scheme under which:

It is also shown that a particular apartment complex containing
22 acres located on five city squares, on which are situated 794
rental units, and which is assessed at $10,000,000.00, is assessed
as one parcel and will be taxed for $100.00 under the ordinance.
At the same time, a single family residence, in the same subdivision, having an assessment of $75,000.00 will also be taxed
$100.00 The testimony further reveals that a single family residence situated on two lots may be taxed $200.00 because each
lot is assessed separately.4
The attack on such a system would be a similar reverse equal protection attack-failure to make classifications and differentiations based
on the value and/or size of the property involved. In any event, since
the kind of classification (or failure to classify) was not a suspect
classification, little judicial scrutiny would be involved. Administrative convenience presumably would be adequate reason for
proceeding as the city did. Indeed, if the attack were to have succeeded here, why not a similar attack on the three-dollar license fee
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Kirsch v. Parker, 375 So. 2d 693, 699 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
377 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1979).
377 So. 2d at 1208 (Summers, C.J., dissenting).
377 So. 2d at 1211 (Landry, J., dissenting).
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for all automobiles regardless of value or age, a flat license fee
which is required under the state constitution?' 5 The ultimate disposition of the case here reflects the general view that classifications based on wealth will not be given great scrutiny and that the
government is given substantial leeway in financial, business regulation, and taxation matters.
State v. Scallon" takes a traditional approach and finds no
denial of equal protection under a Sunday closing law which exempts the sale of some kinds of products but not others. Indeed, in a
one-page opinion, Justice Tate does not discuss the equal protection
argument at length, being content to cite City of New Orleans v.
Dukes'7 to support a very low level of scrutiny in such classifications. The case is consistent with the majority view in the country,
but the result is still somewhat disquieting. Even if one accepts the
8
traditional view coming from McGowan v. Maryland"
that there is
no impermissible establishment of religion in requiring businesses to
close on Sunday, subsequent cases have indicated dissatisfaction
with that rule.'9 It at least ought to be an area where one is quite
sensitive to the application of these laws because they do touch
upon some religious groups' scruples.
Even accepting, however, that a uniform day of rest is an important social value regardless of its connection (or lack of connection)
with religious observances, and agreeing that it seems rational to
make some exception for necessities being sold on that uniform day
of rest, the classification system that has been adopted seems hardly
related to the necessities concept. Additions to and changes in the
list of the exceptions over the years have produced a patchwork,
crazy-quilt pattern of exempt activities whose rationality seems virtually impossible to fathom." It is difficult to understand how such a
classification can sustain even the inquiry of a low level of scrutiny.
For example, it is prohibited to sell new or used automobiles,
lumber, or building supply material." However, it is permissible to
sell real property or mobile homes or appliances. While it is generally not possible to sell clothing or furniture on Sunday, those items
can be sold in the Vieux Carr6 section of New Orleans. 2 Even more
45.
46.
47.

LA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
374 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1979).
427 U.S. 297 (1976).

48.

366 U.S. 420 (1961).

49. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 398 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. LA. R.S. 51:191-95 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
51. LA. R.S. 51:194(A) (1950).
52. LA. R.S. 51:194(E)(3) (Supp. 1972 & 1977).
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inconsistent and less rational are the numerous municipal ordinances' which under the authority of state law' suspend, or otherwise delimit or exempt, provisions of the state law requiring Sunday
closings.
An attempt in the 1980 legislature to bring some rationality into
this scheme and to allow more activities on Sunday was not successful. The debate clearly showed that a large number of opponents
of the liberalization measure were motivated by religious considerations.55
Considering the establishment of religion overtones involved in
these legislative choices, and considering the lack of a rational basis
for the kinds of exemptions that do exist, cases such as Scallon
ought to be reexamined. That indeed appears to be the growing
trend.'
SUPREME COURT INHERENT AUTHORITY

The supreme court has reaffirmed its inherent authority to control the practice of law, choosing to apply its own standard regulating out-of-state law firm partnerships instead of a more restrictive

53. For example, Baton Rouge City Code Title 9, section 39(a)(2)(a) provides:
"Retail dealers, licensed under the provisions of this ordinance, who realize at least
sixty (60) per cent of their monthly revenues from the sale of merchandise other than
alcoholic beverages may sell beer between 12:30 p.m. Sunday and 12:00 midnight Sunday."
54. LA. R.S. 51:195 (Supp. 1976).
55. New Orleans Times Picayune, May 22, 1980, at 26, col. 1-6 (Unenforceable Blue
Law Survives Repeal Try), May 28, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (Blue Law Repeal Defeated);
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, May 22, 1980, at 11, col. 1-6 (Senate Panel Rejects Bill
Seeking Repeal of Blue Law), May 28, 1980, at 5, col. 4-5 (Closing Law Bill Apparently
Dead).
56. See, e.g., Dodge Town, Inc. v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461 (Utah 1971) (Statute prohibiting new and used automobile dealers from selling on Sunday is unconstitutional. It
does not protect against theft or fraudulent sales since sales on other days when offices of record are closed are permitted. It discriminates against licensed dealers
because other persons may sell autos); Hughes v. Reynolds, 157 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. 1967)
(Act which allowed the sale of otherwise prohibited items on Sunday if those sales
were less than 50% of total sales was unconstitutional); Milliken v. Jensen, 281 N.E.2d
401 (Ill. 1972) (Held, an ordinance which prohibits public dances on Sunday, but not
other kinds of business was an irrational classification and therefore invalid); Moore v.
Thompson, 126 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1960) (Sunday closing statute which operated only
against certain classes of businesses, rather than generally upon all, was unconstitutional); Rutledge v. Gaylord's Inc., 213 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 1975) (The Common Day of Rest
Act which prohibited certain sales by certain businesses, but not others, was patently
discriminatory); Twin Fair Distributor's Corp. v. Cosgrove, 380 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y.
1976) (Sunday Closing Statute allowing for selective and discriminatory enforcement,
and creating myriad exceptions without reason, denied equal protection).
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statute prohibiting such partnerships.57 The court is on
established ground in asserting its inherent authority to
bar, and while there is some uncertainty as to the extent
herent powers, prior cases clearly establish that these
tend to control of the practice of law.58
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traditional,
control the
of these inpowers ex-

The 1974 constitution did not restrict this intrinsic power. It
continues, in Article II, the doctrine of separation of powers which
supports inherent authority. Article V, section 5, is an enlargement
of supreme court authority rather than a restriction, in its recognition of power to "establish procedural and administrative rules not
in conflict with the law." The debate indicated a desire to expand
court power by recognizing additional rulemaking authority subject
to legislative control. However, there was no intent to change the
traditional inherent powers of the court which are not subject to
legislative control. 9
DUE PROCESS - VAGUENESS
In State v. Dousay, ° the supreme court held unconstitutionally
vague a provision of the sanitary code making it a crime to fail "to
take all usual and all reasonable measures and precautions to secure
and ensure the proper operation and maintenance fo [sic] a sewage
treatment plant or sewage disposal system." 1 In an opinion by Justice Dixon, the court applied the traditional requirement that an individual must be given a reasonable adequate notice that certain
conduct is proscribed. It may be ironic that "reasonable measures
and precautions" is not definite enough to inform a "reasonable
man" of what is prohibited, but the case seems to be correctly decided. In any case, the void for vagueness doctrine is a slippery one,
and one in which great flexibility exists. In searching for predictability, the most certainty comes from a comparison of word formulas in various cases and an attempt to make comparisons from
which to develop some trend of decision. The instant case, for exam2
ple, seems to be quite close to Scott v. District Attorney,"
in which
the defendant's conviction for loitering "without being able to ac57. Singer Hutner Levine Seeman & Stuart v. Louisiana State Bar Association,
378 So. 2d 423 (La. 1979).
58. Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prod., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979); Louisiana State
Bar Association v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976); Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582 (1942).
59. Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA.
L. REV. 765, 766 (1977).
60. 378 So. 2d 414 (La. 1979).
61. Id. at 415.
62. 309 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1970).
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count for his lawful presence" ' 3 was overturned for vagueness. Unlike Wainwright v. Stone,"4 here there exists no common law definition to clarify the vagueness of the word formula, nor are there
prior decisions, as in State v. Lindsey,65 defining an unclear
statutory formula. Also, since this involves criminal law, a higher
standard of certainty is expected. While the highest requirements of
specificity applicable to statutes that conflict with first amendment
concerns may not be applicable here, a comparison with City of
Baton Rouge v. Ewing" suggests that the statute is equally vague
with the word formula in Ewing: "indecent, vile, and profane
language." The case presents an interesting counterpoint to State v.
67
Gisclair,
in which on motion to quash, a 4-3 supreme court upheld a
statute making it an offense to pay a governmental employee for
services "grossly inadequate" for such payment or compensation.
Chief Justice Dixon dissented in Gisclair along with Justices Dennis
and Calogero, but Dousay is a unanimous decision reflecting the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the sanitary code in question.
Perhaps Gisclair is explainable because it was decided on the motion
to quash, where there was still the opportunity for a factual inquiry
to determine the conduct and pay in question, and the possibility
that under the facts there was adequate notice.
Another element that comes into play in this vagueness analysis
is whether there exists a reasonable alternative means of articulating the standard of conduct involved. In dealing with sewage
disposal, when objective testing and measurement is available, it
would be relatively easy for a board to establish certain technical requirements for operation of such plants. It may well be that in a
Gisclair-type situation, it is virtually impossible to be much more
definite in terms of overpaying public employees who do not do an
adequate amount of work. Also, while the matter is less than clear,
the public payroll fraud provision of article 138 of the Criminal Code
seems to require a type of mental element, implying the necessity
for a corrupt motive before one can be found guilty under that article. On the other hand, Dousay involves an absolute liability provi63. Id. R.S. 14:107(7) & (8) were thus found unconstitutional because "they
stigmatize as criminal conduct that it is impossible to define concretely or that is so
universal as to be beyond the reach of the criminal law under our Constitution." Id. at
839.
64. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (a Florida statute proscribing the
"abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or beast" was
held not unconstitutionally vague in light of the state supreme court's longstanding
construction of the article).
65. 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975).
66. 308 So. 2d 776 (La. 1975).
67. 363 So. 2d 696 (La. 1978).
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sion without a mental element and the application of criminal liability for failing to act, rather than for acting. Similarly, State v.
Newton" found Article 119, defining bribery of voters, to be constitutional despite some vague language, by reading a corrupt intent
requirement into the statute.
The decision in Dousay seems quite correct, for it is almost an
entirely ex post facto inquiry to determine whether particular nonaction was reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances. A
person in good faith attempting in advance to regulate his conduct
as society requires would have to wait until after a decision was
made by a fact-finder before being able to act as required. What is
troublesome is trying to reconcile the analysis in Dousay with the
cases which suggest that the negligent homicide provisions 9 of the
Criminal Code are not unconstitutionally vague. There, the statute
penalizes killings caused by criminal negligence, which is defined as
a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person
under similar circumstances."0 In light of Dousay, it seems difficult
to avoid the conclusion that this "reasonable person" standard is
just as unclear as the "failing to take reasonable measures" word
formula. Perhaps the additional requirement of a "gross" deviation
helps to make the statute more precise-but not much. Perhaps, in
the typical traffic death case, the reference to other traffic laws and
speeding laws and driving while intoxicated laws adds an element of
certainty as to what is prohibited-but what if no such laws exist?
Absent such other provisions adding some certainty to the word formula, it would seem that a person is left without advance guidance
as to what he can or cannot do, and must wait until after a jury has
determined reasonableness to know whether his conduct is permissible or not. Indeed, this fact has no doubt troubled the supreme court
and is important in explaining why the court has been willing to
overturn fact-finding decisions of juries concerning guilt of negligent
homicide for conduct that one could not reasonably anticipate would
be unconstitutional. 1
Post-hoc appellate review to overturn jury verdicts finding
gross deviations from the standard of care of a reasonable man are
understandable and perhaps necessary to assure uniformity and a
correct application of this very flexible standard. But it is a secondary solution. It would be preferable to require adequate definitions
in advance and to spare citizens the expense and the trouble of hay68.
69.
70.
71.

328 So. 2d 110 (La. 1976).
LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950 & Supp. 1978); 14:32 (1950).
LA. R.S. 14:12 (1950).
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 298 So. 2d 774 (La. 1974).
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ing to go through a trial. Perhaps the explanation for the negligent
homicide decisions is that there is very little alternative to the
gross deviations statutory formula. But if one depends on other traffic rules and other statutes to establish the basic duty in the first
place, would it not be just as easy to establish a statutory formula
that would refer to these certain statutes, instead of leaving the
open-ended statute that currently exists?
In an area where easy alternatives exist, the court in Dousay
did not look to the facts of a particular case but found the statute
unconstitutional on its face. A bill of information was quashed in the
decision, and there were no factual findings as to whether a particular defendant should have known that the particular conduct in
question was prohibited, even if the statute might have some unconstitutional applications.
DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO SUE
Flynn v. Devore7" held that a mother of a major son could not
recover for wrongful death against her son's employer under Civil
Code article 2315; she was restricted to a workers' compensation
remedy. The case is a traditional application of the notion that there
is no fundamental institutional right to sue for damages caused by a
defendant. This is consistent with federal developments and
developments in other states73 and is also supported by a prior Louisiana decision." It was argued that Article I, section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution added additional rights in its statement that: "All
courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial,
partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person,
property, reputation, or other rights." The legislative history of this
section indicates that it was not to be an extension of rights to
recover for injury, but was the continuation of a prior article which
had not been given substantial interpretation.75 The key to understanding this section is the reference to "due process of law and
justice," and the flexibility inherent in that concept. Certainly it
would be unwise to freeze into constitutional law the vagaries and
the policies that accompany the tort doctrines as they develop and
are modified by statute.
72. 373 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
73. Bergen v. Fourth Skyline Corp., 501 F.2d 1174 (4th Cir. 1974); Massey v.
Thiokol Chem. Corp., 368 F. Supp. 668 (S.D. Ga. 1973); Mariscal v. American Smelting
& Ref. Co., 24 Ariz. 161, 536 P.2d 1053 (1975); Finn v. Industrial Comm'n 437 P.2d 542
(1968); Maiuri v. Sinacola Constr. Co., 170 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. 1969); Mullarkey v. Florida
Feed Mills Inc., 268 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972).
74. Branch v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 3d Cir: 1979).
75. Hargrave, supra note 34, at 65.

